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LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE.* By Sissela 
Bok. New York: Pantheon Books. 1978. Pp. xxii, 326. $10.95. 
0 what a tangled web we weave, 
When first we practice to deceive!• 
Parents, clergymen, and teachers warn us throughout our 
lives of the evils of dishonesty, yet lying remains among the most 
consistent characteristics of human behavior. Why is lying bad? 
Are lies ever justifiable? How can a society evaluate the merits 
of some of its most accepted and pervasive patterns of deception?, 
Sissela Bok's recent book probes these disconcerting questions 
perceptively, intelligently, and readably. Although she fails to 
provide indisputable answers, she demonstrates that the issues 
are susceptible to rational discussion by sensitive individuals. 
The first third of the book establishes the theoretical back-
ground to Bok's view of the subject. She adopts a broad defini-
tion-a lie is any statement made with the intention to de-
ceive-to give her analysis maximum scope. She then presents 
capsule criticisms of two approaches moral theorists have tradi-
tionally taken to the issue of deception. Building largely on the 
hypothetical situation in which a lie may be.necessary to save a 
life, she rejects the rigid Kantian theory which condemns all lies.2 
Nevertheless, she rejects with equal vehemence any simple-
minded utilitarian approach that would permit a prospective liar 
to balance the benefits and harms that he believes a lie would 
cause. Such an approach ignores the damage a lie does to the liar 
himself (in energy expended to cover up, in loss of credibility 
should he be discovered, and in increased propensity to tell future 
lies) and the damage it does to the overall level of trust in commu-
nication throughout society. Even more dangerous is the fact that 
the liar's perspective is often biased: he underestimates the risk 
of discovery and overestimates the consequential benefits of a lie. 
Finally, Bok points out that the liar is prone to ignore the signifi-
cant difference between lies that tend to become institutional 
practices (such as placebo prescriptions by physicians) and lies 
that are truly isolated occurrences. 
The author's system for determining the justifiability of any 
lie is based in moral philosophy3 and has three essential compo-
* This book review was prepared by an Editor of the Michigan Law Review. 
1. SIR WALTER ScoTT, Marmion, in 5 THE WORKS OF WALTER SCOTT, EsQ. 1, 343 
(Edinburgh 1813). 
2. For a modern neo-Kantian view of lying, see C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 54-78 
(1978). 
3. Bok appears to have been strongly influenced by the thinking ofR.F. Harrod. She 
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nents. Primary is the "principle of veracity": Lies are not neu-
tral-they always have harmful side effects; therefore, a lie is 
never justified if there is an adequate truthful alternative. The 
second feature of Bok's system. is a refined utilitarianism: A lie 
for which no truthful alternative exists is to be evaluated accord-
ing to its costs and benefits, but all costs must be consid-
ered-costs to the liar, to the deceived, and to society. All costs 
cannot be considered, however, unless one subdues one's biases 
and appreciates all perspectives-that of the liar and that of the 
dupe, that of the individual case and that of the general practice 
which includes the case. Finally, the author invokes the 
"principle of publicity": To be morally justified, a lie must be 
defensible before the community of "reasonable persons" in gen-
eral. Such an audience would, in theory, be able to adopt the 
perspective of the deceived as easily as that of the liar and would 
therefore check any biases to which a single individual or profes-
sion may be victim. 
The author does not attempt a complete theoretical scheme 
that could unambiguously determine the merits of any lie. Such 
an ambition would necessitate, among other things, a thorough 
definition of the "reasonable person" and a precise value judg-
ment concerning the relative importance of the individual and 
the group. This modesty does not diminish, however, her book's 
contribution to the discipline of applied ethics. Bok's principles 
harbor a moral judgment which coincides with many traditional 
democratic majoritarian values and which therefore will resonate 
with many readers' intuitive processes of rationalization. Even if 
her principles do not specify the direction in which the scales will 
ultimately tip in an individual case, they suggest factors to be 
considered and procedures by which to weigh them. 
In the remainder of the book, Bok applies her principles to 
several widely acknowledged patterns of deception, patterns 
which many deem justified. Her analyses of such topics as white 
lies, lies to children, lies for "the public good" (Bob Woodward 
and Carl Bernstein receive particularly pointed criticism), lies to 
the sick and dying, and lies in letters of recommendation will 
surely provoke many a fascinating dinner-table discussion. Few 
readers will be able to escape the author's conclusion that our 
society has been far too glib in its acceptance of mendacity when-
includes an excerpt from Harrod, Utilitarianism Revised, 45 MIND 137, 147-54 (1936), and 
excerpts from other notable essays on deception, in a valuable thirty-nine page appendix 
to her book. 
Jan.-Mar. 1979] Lying 541 
ever a greater good is arguably promoted. 4 
Of special interest to lawyers is the latter part of chapter XI, 
in which Bok discusses the attorney-client privilege. She begins 
with Monroe Freedman's argument that a lawyer has a profes-
sional responsibility to build upon his client's testimony in argu-
ing before a court, even when he has strong grounds to think the 
testimony perjurious.5 Although Bok 1mpiicitly suggests that 
more lawyers accept Professor Freedman's view than is the case, 6 
her substantive analysis sharpens a decade's debate.7 In particu-
lar, her publicity principle suggests that the legal profession's 
attempt to define the privilege has courted moral bias by failing 
to consult laymen. 
The problem here, as with many other deceptive professional prac-
tices, is that the questions are too often left up to the professionals 
themselves, whereas the issues obviously touch the public welfare 
immediately. There is, then, a great need for a wider debate and 
analysis of these issues. . . . Such a debate would have to go far 
beyond the confines of the American Bar Association and the 
teaching of professional responsibility in law schools. [P.162] 
Bok does not want public control of the debate; rather, she wants 
the public to participate in and to know about its resolution. 
When thirty-eight percent of the nation agrees that "most law-
yers would engage in unethical or illegal activities to help a client 
in an important case, "8 a profession anxious to regain its dignity 
might heed such friendly criticism. 
4. This acceptance is satirized in J. R. Pope's conclusion to Scott's famous epigram 
quoted in the text at note 1 supra: 
But when we've practiced quite a while 
How vastly we improve our style! 
Quoted in ESPY, AN Af.MANAC oF WoRDS AT PLAY 215 (1975). 
5. See M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETlilcs IN AN ADVERSARY S'YSTEM (1975); Freedman, 
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest 
Questions, 64 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1469 (1966). 
6. For a thorough evaluation of the current views of the courts and the orga-
nized bar, see Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 809 (1977). 
But see M. FREEDMAN, supra note 5, at 38, which cites a survey in which 90% of the 
attorneys responding stated that they would call a perjurious client to th~ stand and 
question him in the normal manner. The discrepancy between the attitudes expressed 
publicly by scholars and the actual practices of courtroom lawyers may indicate the 
ethical strain felt daily by many attorneys. It would seem, therefore, that all members 
of the profession would benefit from an intensive public effort to clarify the lawyer-client 
relationship. · · . 
7. See, e.g., G. HAzARD, ET1Ucs IN THE PRACTICE OF LAw 120-35 (1978); Lefst~m, The 
Criminal Defendant Who Proposes Perjury: Rethinking the Defense Lawyer's Dilemma, 
6 HOFSTRA L. R.Ev. 665 (1978); Polster, The Dilemma of the Perjurious Defendant: Resolu-
tion, Not Avoidance, 28 CASE W. REs. L. R.Ev. 3 (1977). 
8. B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBUC 232 (1977). 
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Sissela Bok's work may dissatisfy purists who seek a fully 
developed philosophical theory of lying. To people who face diffi-
cult moral choices in their daily lives, however, Lying is a per-
suasive invitation to tackle those choices head-on and a demon-
stration that a few theoretical guidelines can prove powerful allies 
in the ethical struggle. 
